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ABSTRACT 
Safety in construction is a problem that has been gaining increased attention in recent 
years. Although lots of research is being done to address different aspects of improving safety, 
the challenge remains in narrowing the focus by identifying specific problems. This study 
attempts to find problems in safety by collecting data from construction sites and performing an 
analysis. 
The data collection involved obtaining 205 incident investigation reports from a number 
of refinery and thermal power plant sites that belonged to the same contracting firm. Out of the 
205 incidents, 120 were attributed to root causes that were method related. 
A software model is proposed, with the aim to reduce a considerable amount of effort and 
time spent writing method statements. Very few activities are covered, and the most important 
advantage is that the method statement can be implemented more efficiently with accurate data, 
design and accessibility within the standards.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
The construction industry stands second in terms of its contribution to India’s economy, 
only after agriculture. It is a highly labor-intensive industry and provides employment to a large 
rural population. At the same time, it is also one of the most hazardous industries and is 
generally known for a relatively high number of work-related accidents. Deadly construction 
accidents are quite common in India where the rules and procedures are often disregarded. 
Statistical data related to occupational injuries and fatalities are not available for India because 
the industry is widely disorganized. There is neither a dependable system available nor any 
organization to monitor the accident rates. The workers in this industry are comprised mostly of 
illiterate people who do not understand the risks to which they are exposed, and also, they are 
uninformed about their rights. This makes it expedient for contractors to exploit these workers to 
improve profitability. Due to globalization, there have been an increased number of international 
companies taking up infrastructure projects in India. As a policy, many of these international 
companies consider Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) a matter of highest importance. 
They are even coercing Indian contractors to upgrade their safety norms and procedures.  
There are a few major companies in the country which implement HSE better than other 
companies. This tiny number of contractors is also, obviously, the chosen ones for international 
projects in India. Although these contractors perform better than other Indian contractors, their 
safety performances are still a matter of concern. Even though they are professionally managed 
companies, they are terribly deprived of the awareness about the long-term benefits of 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) systems, which is evident because the companies’ remain 
poor with implementing safety standards despite adopting certifications such as OHSAS 18001, 
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etc. At most construction companies, HSE is generally given the lowest priority. For the few 
companies which do establish systems for OHS management, they do not get the necessary 
support or cooperation from existing departments. By and large, only after some untoward 
incident occurs do contractors begin to take action. In other words, contractors are reactive rather 
than being proactive. The monetary and legal liabilities for poor safety practices are huge. It does 
not end with a loss of lives or personal sufferings, but it causes project delays and a loss of 
productivity, legal suits and revenue losses, reduced employee morale, and affects the overall 
image of the company in terms of winning contracts. Moreover, as the safety standard goes 
higher, it seems prudent for the contractor to ensure, by whatever means, that the safety in its 
organization and at project sites is the best.  
1.2. Objectives of the Research  
 Classify construction incidents by root causes assigned by the investigators 
 Develop a software model to facilitate Method statements, in order to meet the urgent 
needs of bringing a marked improvement to the construction industry’s current safety 
practices. 
1.3. Scope  
One of India’s major construction companies was available to offer accident data for this 
research. The company had a number of contracts in different parts of the country, providing 
sufficient data for reasonable analysis. Because the available data were limited to a particular 
kind of construction project, refinery and power-plant construction, the analysis and results only 
pertain to these kinds of projects. Also, while safety is normally accompanied by health and 
environmental principles, and together, the three are considered equally important, this study 
limits itself to safety principles.  
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1.4. Research Methodology  
The major phases of the project are shown in Figure 1. The approach to achieve the 
research objectives had a mix of literature review as well as studying the safety documents, 
accident investigation reports and proposed software concept.  
 
   Defining Scope
  Identification of   
    Data sources
  Data Collection
  Data Analysis
Recommendations
 
Figure 1.  Major Phases of the Project 
 
1.4.1. Defining the Scope and Identifying Data Sources 
A review of the available literature related to construction safety and discussions with 
experts in the field helped to decide the project’s scope and to choose the type of data to collect. 
Incident analysis reports were both accessible and useful.  
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 1.4.2. Data Collection  
Data were collected from the available source, one of the major construction contractors 
for refinery and power-plant projects. Accident investigation reports were abundant in number 
but they were unorganized. The accident reports included fatalities, near misses, dangerous 
occurrences, lost-time injuries, and minor incidents. Data were available from 5 sites, with 3 sites 
contributing the most incidents, possibly due to the number of years those sites had been in 
operation.  
1.4.3. Data Analysis  
The observations and nonconformities mentioned in the reports were related to the 
corresponding clauses in the OHSAS 18001:2007 standard. The analysis was comprised of 
gathering the root causes of the unsafe conditions that existed during the accidents from the 
accident descriptions and then coding these root causes into broader cause categories. Later, the 
causes were ranked based on the number of incidents to which they were attributed in order to 
identify the most significant causes. It was found that method-related causes played a major role.  
1.4.4. Recommendations  
Finally, a plan for improving how method statements are written is suggested through this 
research.  
1.5. Organization of the Paper 
The paper is presented in five chapters. The remaining four chapters are organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature of earlier works related to the present research. It 
discusses the various problems that were addressed and the different methodologies adopted by 
them, summarizing the findings in four subsections. Chapter 3 gives a detailed description about 
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the methodology for data collection and analysis. It reveals the findings of the research and 
discusses the problem identified in detail. Chapter 4 proposes the Software Concept for Method 
Statements. Chapter 5 presents Conclusions. 
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2. METHOD STATEMENTS FROM A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
2.1. Factors Affecting Safety in Developing Countries 
Construction is always a risky task because of outdoor operations, work-at heights, 
complicated on-site plants, and equipment operation coupled with workers’ attitudes and 
behaviors towards safety (Choudhry and Fang 2008). Construction is much more unsafe than 
manufacturing. This is partly due to the more hazardous working methods and machines 
employed in construction (Helander 1991). These situations at construction sites expose workers 
to lots of risks. Many safety hazards are specific to the particular job classification, and typically, 
construction workers underestimate the hazards with their own work.  
This affects the motivation for adopting safe work procedures (Helander 1991). Research 
has been done to identify problems for construction safety all over the world. Some research 
findings from developing countries also apply to Indian sites. Kartam et al. (2000) have 
observed, at Kuwaiti construction sites, that the problems arise due to disorganized labor, poor 
accident record-keeping and reporting systems, extensive use of foreign laborers, extensive use 
of subcontractors, a lack of safety regulations and legislation, the low priority given to safety, the 
small size of most construction firms, competitive tendering, and severe weather conditions 
during the summer. Tam et al. (2004) conclude from their research of Chinese construction 
companies that the main factors affecting safety performance include top management’s poor 
safety awareness, lack of training, project managers’ poor safety awareness, reluctance to input 
resources for safety, and reckless operations. One study in Taiwan (Cheng et al. 2010) also 
identified problems that included not valuing the importance of safety measures implemented at 
workplaces, not giving sufficient safety education to new workers, and not hiring well-trained 
safety and health personnel to implement safety measures. A high standard of safety was found 
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in Thailand construction projects, where all 16 critical success factors identified from a literature 
survey, are given attention (Aksorn and Hadikusumo 2008). These critical success factors were 
given by them under four dimensions: worker involvement, safety prevention and control 
systems, safety arrangement, and management commitment. 
2.2. Construction Accidents and Causative Factors 
Construction-site accidents are very common because the sites are highly risk prone. The 
likelihood that an accident will have severe consequences increases when it involves vehicles, 
scaffolding, structures, or ladders (Lopez et al. 2008). Specific training for scaffolding and other 
equipment is not well administered in many places. Halperin and McCann (2004) have pointed 
out that most scaffold-competent persons do not have adequate training to allow them to 
ascertain when a scaffold is unsafe. A large proportion of construction accidents are due to 
workers falling.  
Occupations such as construction laborers, roofers, carpenters, and structural metal 
workers are commonly involved in falls, and these hazards should be specifically addressed 
through fall-prevention efforts (Huang and Hinze 2003). Recording accidents and near misses is 
vital for analysis because the reports could highlight the causes towards which prevention efforts 
can be directed. Different approaches have been used to find the causes of construction 
accidents. In a study by Cheng et al. (2010), 1,347 occupational accident and fatality reports 
were subjected to statistical analysis and data-mining association rules. The results showed that 
both workers and management had insufficient awareness about safety issues and potential 
hazards. Most accidents were found to stem from a combination of 
i. Management’s failure to implement adequate safety measures to protect workers against  
ii. Potential hazards in the working environment and 
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iii. The many unsafe acts committed by workers themselves. 
Construction-project features, such as the project nature, method of construction, site 
restriction, project duration, procurement system, design complexity, level of construction, and 
subcontracting, contribute to accidents, and that the features’ contribution is through the 
introduction of proximal accident causal factors in the construction process (Manu et al. 2010). 
Abdelhamid and Everett (2000) proposed a model called the Accident Root-cause Tracing Model 
(ARCTM) in order to better identify the root causes by classifying them into three categories. 
The model is a series of questions which should be asked when an accident occurs so that 
identifying the wrong root cause is eliminated. They collected data of accident reports and 
studied the narratives of the accidents. Their model was applied on these data to identify root 
causes that are different from the ones that were actually mentioned in the accident reports. 
Chi et al. (2007) also used a classification coding system in their analysis of 255 
electrical fatalities. However, in one research study (Shapira and Lyachin 2009), using accident 
frequencies to identify factors that affect tower cranes’ safety was rejected since the authors 
believed that many accidents go unreported. 
Ale et al. (2008) used a tool called Story-builder to systematically analyze and classify 
past accident data to gain quantitative insights about the causes and consequences of accidents. 
The importance of precursors and near misses to improve the safety margins and prevent 
accidents has been emphasized by Wu et al. (2010). 
The modified loss causation model (MLCM) for accidents, presented by Chua and Goh 
(2004), was meant to facilitate feedback for the safety management system that failed during the 
accident and for the safety planning process with future construction projects. In order to achieve 
the two levels of feedback, the MLCM was designed to provide a systematic and logical 
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structure for both incident investigation and safety planning such that, if the MLCM was applied 
consistently, the depth and breadth of both the processes would be ensured. By using the MLCM, 
incident-investigation information could be retrieved and utilized for safety planning. 
2.3. Safety Management System 
There is increased interest with systematic approaches to manage occupational health and 
safety as an organizational strategy for the prevention of work-related injuries, ill health, and 
fatalities. Safety standards and environmental standards, such as OHSAS 18001:2007 and ISO 
14001, are being implemented in many countries to improve safety performances. 
The main objective of the Occupational Health and Safety Management System 
(OHSMS) certification scheme is to encourage and enhance safety awareness, to promote safe 
work practices, and to raise the safety standards of the construction industry (Teo et al. 2005). 
Bottani et al. (2008) found, through an empirical investigation, that companies adopting safety 
management systems exhibited higher performance for all the topics encompassing company 
attitude to 
(i) Define safety and security goals, and communicate them to employees; 
(ii) Update risk data and perform risk analysis; 
(iii) Identify risks and define corrective actions; and 
(iv) Develop employees’ training programs. 
While the principles behind safety management are fairly simple in concept, it is during 
the implementation of such a program that construction companies may encounter their most 
difficult obstacles (Wilson 2000). Issues such as cooperation from others are vital, yet 
profoundly ignored, by construction companies which is why seemingly simple problems 
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continue to exist. There are various aspects of safety management. Some of the research done on 
these is given in the next sections. 
2.3.1. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
Hazard identification and risk assessment are important to avoid construction accidents 
because the causes can only be eliminated after becoming aware of them. Identifying hazards 
and their corresponding control measures provides the foundation for a safety program and 
essentially determines the scope, content, and complexity of a successful OHSMS (Mearns and 
Flin 1995). Makin and Winder (2008) developed a conceptual framework to ensure that an 
OHSMS brings together the merits of the three main control strategies for dealing with 
workplace hazards: safe place, safe person, and safe systems. 
However, hazard identification is often not properly done at construction sites. Carter and 
Smith (2006) collected and analyzed method statements from three UK construction projects. 
They found that only 6.7% of the method statements identified all the hazards that should have 
been noted. In the area of risk assessment, a few models have been suggested. One model 
(Jannadi and Almishari 2003) was a method of estimating risk that gives convincing results that 
are known to be sufficiently reliable and accurate to serve as a basis for managerial decisions. 
Another risk assessment model by Fung et al. (2009) used MS Excel software and a large 
amount of historical data about the risk levels of different work trades to provide quantitative 
risk assessment. Moriama and Ohtani (2008) also suggested a risk-assessment tool which 
includes human-related elements. 
2.3.2. Safety-Culture and Safety-Climate Assessments 
The safety culture will ascertain and reflect the effectiveness of a safety management 
system at any construction site. Developing a positive safety culture can be an effective tool for 
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improving safety at any construction site (Choudhry et al. 2007). Available literature shows the 
use of surveys and statistics to assess safety culture/climate-related theories.  
In Dingsdag et al. (2008), questionnaire data from workers on construction sites 
suggested that workers’ perceptions about the primary characteristics of a safety culture 
validated the accepted precepts of a safety culture found in safety-culture theory, such as 
communication, and was at variance with several safety critical leadership positions. Mohamed 
(2002) used a questionnaire-based model to assess the safety climate at construction sites, 
corroborating the importance for the role of management commitment, communication, workers’ 
involvement, attitudes, and competence, as well as supportive and supervisory environments, in 
achieving a positive safety climate. 
2.3.3. Design Approach to Safety 
The associated risks contributing to incidents are sometimes linked to the construction 
projects’ design phase. Such risks, according to some researchers, can be reduced or eliminated 
by designing for construction safety. Behm (2005) analyzed 224 fatality investigation reports and 
a link to the construction-safety concept’s design was determined. The results showed that 42% 
of the reviewed fatalities were linked to the concept. Other research (Gambatese et al. 2008) was 
conducted to confirm the findings of this study which revealed a link between construction-site 
fatalities and the construction-safety concept’s design. An expert panel established to review a 
sample of the 224 fatality cases from the previous research was in agreement for 71% of the 
cases reviewed, giving further evidence about the design’s influence on construction-site safety. 
A design tool has also been developed (Gambatese and Hinze 1999) to assist designers in 
identifying project-specific safety hazards and to provide best practices to eliminate the hazards. 
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2.3.4. Behavior-Based Approach to Safety 
Workers’ risk-taking behavior is a significant contributor for most accidents (Johnson et 
al. 1998). Mullen (2004) has identified factors that influence unsafe behavior at construction 
sites as follows: 
1. Organizational factors, such as socializing influence, role overload, and performance over 
safety  
2. Safety attitudes and perceived risk’s 
3. Image factors, such as macho syndrome and competence 
4. Avoiding negative consequences, such as teasing and harassment from co-workers, and  
5. Fear of losing the position 
Al-Hemoud and Al-Asfoor (2006) pointed out that there is clear evidence that behavior-
based safety initiatives centered on the positive-performance feedback technique are effective for 
improving and maintaining the safety behavior. Lingard (2002) concluded that first-aid training 
can have a positive, preventive effect and could complement traditional occupational health and 
safety training programs. 
However, a behavior-based safety management program in the Hong Kong construction 
industry (Lingard and Rowlinson 1997), which introduced the techniques of performance 
measurement, participative goal setting, and the provision of performance feedback in a carefully 
controlled field experiment at seven public-housing construction sites, obtained mixed results. 
Behavior-based safety techniques were highly effective in bringing about improved performance 
for site housekeeping, but significant improvements with access to heights were only observed at 
two of the seven sites, and there was no significant improvement in the use of bamboo 
scaffolding during the experimental intervention. The results indicated that behavior-based 
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safety-management techniques are not universally effective in bringing about improved safety 
performance in the Hong Kong construction context. Other factors, such as management’s 
commitment, the ability to meet goals, goal rejection, hazard perception, and recognition, were 
stated as possible causes for deviation from the expected result. These factors should be well 
established for behavior-based safety training to work. 
2.3.5. Software-Based Safety Management 
Bansal (2010) proposed a GIS-based, navigable, 4D animation for the safety-planning 
process that facilitates an easier understanding of the construction sequence and predicts places 
and activities which have a higher potential for accidents. This approach integrated safety-code 
provisions and expert recommendations with components or activities that make safety planning 
more realistic. 
A similar study (Benjaoran and Bhokha 2010) developed an integrated system for safety 
and construction management that incorporates safety measures into early designs and plans. A 
rule-based algorithm was formulated to automatically detect working at hazardous heights in 
designs and plans and to responsively advise proper safety measures. These integrated safety 
measures are also visualized via the 4D CAD model that clearly notifies the participants. 
Lee et al. (2009) proposed a mobile safety-monitoring tool that consisted of a mobile-
sensing device for detecting the worker's approach, transmitter sets and repeaters for sending the 
detected information to a receiver, and exclusive software for interpreting this information which 
could be used to decrease the potential for fall accidents. 
Carter and Smith (2006) introduced an IT tool called “Total safety” to create method 
statements which supposedly improve the level of hazard identification for construction projects. 
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Cheung et al. (2004) designed a web-based safety monitoring and assessing system called 
CSHM (Construction Safety and Health Monitoring) that helps project managers and 
administrators to assess safety and health performance in a timely manner. CSHM’s primary 
purpose is to reduce occupational accidents by directly observing and instantaneously assessing 
the data submitted in order to take fast, educated preventive and corrective measures. 
2.4. Summary and Points of Deviation 
The literature review was presented to elucidate the factors affecting construction safety 
by looking at some work done in developing countries, some investigations done on accident 
data, and different methodologies that are generally adopted for such research. There are 
different approaches for safety management and few of the IT-based software programs 
developed for safety were mentioned in the literature review. Of particular importance is the fact 
that there is not enough emphasis on preventing unsafe methods with any of the safety-
management strategies. Factors influencing unsafe behavior have been studied; many research 
studies have tried to address this issue with different solution concepts. Efforts are being made to 
train workers and to modify their behavior as seen in the literature. Unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions are not necessarily due to individual behavior. There is so much scope for research to 
improve the methodologies adopted for work by addressing other factors apart from behavior. 
Similarly, the solution concept, a software program, assumes a slightly different concept for 
method statements, not the one that identifies hazard, as will be discussed in detail later. 
                                          
 
 
15 
 
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
3.1. Overview  
Identifying problem areas for construction safety depended on studying confidential data, 
and only limited information was available. As already mentioned, only one company was 
available to share documents. Incident-investigation reports were collected and studied.  
3.2. Investigating the Incident Reports  
Incident investigation is an important tool for preventing the reoccurrence of incidents 
and also for identifying opportunities for improvement (BSI). Because there were limitations to 
incident, investigation reports were obtained for study.  
3.2.1. Data Collection and Analysis  
The incident data were obtained from 5 construction sites which, again, included both 
refinery and power-plant construction projects. The reports were available for incidents that took 
place from 2006 to 2009. The reports were not organized, and they, first, had to be sorted based 
on the incident type. Two hundred and five reports were initially collected and included incidents 
under five types: fatality, near miss, dangerous occurrence, lost-time injury and medical 
treatment and first-aid cases. The last two categories were combined into one category called 
“minor incidents” for the purpose of this research. The number of minor incidents contributed 
the most, about 41% of the reports, followed by lost-time injury cases with 39%. The number of 
incidents and the percentages for each type are given in Table 1 and Figure 1, respectively. 
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Table 1. Types of Incidents: Numbers 
Type of Incident  Number of Cases  
Fatality  7  
Lost-time injury  79  
Minor incidents  84  
Dangerous occurrence  12  
Near miss  23  
 
 
Figure 2. Type of Incidents: Percentages. 
 
Based on the description of the incidents and the direct causes mentioned in the incident-
investigation report, the nature of the incidents was found. The incident nature fell into 5 
categories: fall, struck-by, caught-in-between, electrocution, and others. It was seen that many 
incidents were struck-by incidents, surprisingly a lot more than the number of fall incidents at 
these sites. Table 2 and Figure 3, respectively, give the number and percentages for the cases in 
Fatality  
3% 
Lost time injury  
39% 
Minor Incidents  
41% 
Dangerous 
occurrence  
6% 
Near miss  
11% 
Chart Title 
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each category. A list was prepared with the types and nature of the incidents. The direct causes, 
root causes, and actions taken were also noted.  
 
Table 2. Nature of Incidents- Numbers 
NATURE NUMBER OF CASES 
Struck-by 123 
Caught in between 45 
Fall 27 
Electrocution 2 
Others 8 
 
 
Figure 3. Nature of Incidents- Percentages 
 
Struck-by  
60% 
Caught in between  
22% 
Fall  
13% 
Electrocution  
1% 
Others  
4% 
Chart Title 
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3.2.2. Identifying Root Causes  
Although some reports identified specific and exact root causes, the root causes identified 
with many incident reports did not properly address why the incidents occurred. They were 
incriminating the workers and supervisors in many cases, stating that the root causes were due to 
“workers being careless” or due to “improper supervision,” but there were not many remarks 
directed at the management, obviously not wanting to blame the company’s own system. A very 
common pattern in the root-causes section seemed to blame the supervisors. For example, if the 
root cause of an incident was identified as poor supervision, it does not tell what the supervisor 
should have looked for or what the supervisor should have done. Supervision, perhaps, is the root 
cause sometimes, but an incident investigation should be able to identify what cause have been 
eliminated by the supervisor. A section for writing the direct causes should have taken care of 
this, but it did not. Other recurring statements were “lack of alertness” or “carelessness of the 
worker.” As an inherently risky job, construction cannot be expected to become safer by making 
the workers more careful. They need to be careful, and that part is supposed to be taken care of 
by regular pep talks and induction trainings. When an incident happens, the causes are generally 
much more than the victims’ “lack of alertness.” The point of investigating incidents is to 
address the causes.  
This kind of investigation left fewer opportunities to find the actual problems in the 
management system that need attention, let alone making proactive decisions. Hence, it was 
decided to use the incident description and to arrive at the root causes, not for the incident that 
happened but, rather, for the unsafe conditions or unsafe acts that existed at the time of the 
incident. The descriptions are assumed to be accurate, and only one dominant root cause was 
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noted in each case. For example, one case was a lost-time injury involving a worker who 
fractured his leg. The description of the incident as given in the report was as follows;  
One structural beam was lifted inside the pipe rack using chain pulley block. After lifting 
it was not matching and required to be trimmed. Hence, the beam was lowered and was kept on 
just one wooden runner near the center. Further packing was being arranged by the co-
workmen. In the meantime, the victim sat on the beam. (Horseplay) Due to this the beam toppled 
and trapped victim’s leg resulting in the injury.  
This case listed “horseplay” as the direct cause of the incident. The root cause was the 
supervisor not bothering to caution the worker, as mentioned in the report. If the unsafe 
condition in this case is considered, the beam was placed on just one wooden runner. It was an 
unsafe condition that could have caused an incident even if the worker was not involved in any 
horseplay. Anybody could have been affected if he/she was in the vicinity of a beam on an 
unstable support. Hence, the actual root cause of this incident was noted as “insufficient 
support.” Another case description is given below.  
A group of workmen were unloading plywood received from supplier at main store. The 
plywood was stacked in the truck as shown in the figure. The workmen first removed the central 
horizontally stacked plywoods, leaving the side stacks leaning on the truck body unstable. When 
the victim was removing plywood from the side stack, 22 plywoods (each weighing 37 kg, total 
load around 800 kg.) fell on the victim, trapping his body below hip, resulting in the injury. 
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Figure 4. Unloading Stacks of Plywood from the Truck- Example Case 
 
In this case report, the identified root cause was the lack of effective supervision. Just 
because the supervisor is there doing effective supervision, it cannot be assured that incidents 
will not happen. Either a safe method of stacking should have been stated or a safe method for 
unloading should have been stated. Hence, for this case, the actual root cause was noted as 
“improper method,” based on the incident description. In fact, improper method was one of the 
broadest categories. It was assigned as the actual root cause whenever an object was unsecured at 
height, whenever a makeshift arrangement was used, whenever slopes of excavations were not 
maintained, etc. although the reports sometimes did not state so.  
In another case of a fatality, the victim had fallen through an opening on a high floor. The 
opening was uncovered because the gratings used to cover it were not tacked, so they had moved 
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because of repeated walking. Although the reason for the grating’s movement from its initial 
position was given as “victim taking shortcut,” had the gratings been tacked, the unfortunate 
incident would not have happened. For this case, “improper walkway” was assigned as the actual 
root cause. When assigning root causes based on the incident narratives, it was not aimed at 
taking the blame off the workers. For example, in one case, a worker took a shortcut between 
two excavated pits instead of taking a wider pathway. In this case, the excavations were to be 
located there; there were warning signs, and the path between them was too narrow to be 
barricaded while the two excavations together had been hard barricaded. Hence, the root cause 
was mentioned as “human error.” Similarly, all the case descriptions were studied, and based on 
the description; the “right” root causes were reached. The Appendix gives some examples about 
how different root causes were assigned while the reports had a different set of root causes.  
3.2.3. Classifying Root Causes  
As explained in the previous section, the root causes for each incident were reached 
through a careful study of the incident-investigation reports. The cause names were chosen to 
create broad categories to mix incidents together for the ease of making conclusions and 
identifying problems. The following causes were identified based on studying the reports and 
were tabulated against the number of cases for each type of incident: dangerous occurrence 
(DO), fatality, lost-time injury (LTI), minor incident (MI), and near miss. 
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Table 3. Classification of the Assigned Root Causes 
 
Root Causes 
 
DO Fatal LTI MI 
Near 
Miss 
Grand 
Total 
Improper equipment   1 2 2 4 
Improper housekeeping   3 5 4 12 
Improper maintenance 2    2 4 
Improper signaling  1   1 2 
Fatigue   1 1 1 3 
Human error 2  9 2  13 
Ignorance 
  
2 
  
2 
Ignorance of use of PPE 
 
1 1 42 
 
44 
Improper method 
  
29 24 6 59 
Improper planning 1 
    
1 
Improper stacking 
  
8 
  
8 
Improper walkway 
 
1 5 
  
6 
Incompetence 
 
2 1 
  
3 
Inexperience 
    
1 1 
Inflammable material unsecured 1 
    
1 
Inspection/Precaution 1 1 4 1 2 9 
Insufficient support 
 
1 4 
  
5 
Lack of coordination 
  
7 4 
 
11 
Lack of skill 2 
  
1 
 
3 
Material component failure 3 
  
1 
 
4 
No method to arrest the Molten 
metal     
2 2 
No proper traffic control 
  
1 
  
1 
No signaling 
  
1 
  
1 
Poor judgment 
   
1 
 
1 
Rash driving 
  
1 
  
1 
Space congestion 
  
1 
  
1 
Work permit system not followed 
    
3 3 
Grand Total 12 7 79 84 23 205 
 
Each of the root causes were then further grouped into men-related causes, machine-
related causes, Material-related causes, or Method-related causes. This grouping is shown in the 
form of a fishbone diagram (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Fishbone Diagram Showing Different Categories of Root Causes 
 
Table 4. Causal Factors- Numbers 
Type of cause DO Fatal LTI MI 
Near 
Miss 
Grand 
Total 
     Machine 2 
 
1 2 3 8 
Material 3 
  
1 
 
4 
Men 4 4 15 47 3 73 
Method 3 3 63 34 17 120 
Grand Total 12 7 79 84 23 205 
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Figure 6. Causal Factors- Percentages 
 
As seen from Table 4, the method-related root causes were greater in number; 120 of the 
205 reviewed reports (about 58%) had a root cause which was related to the work method. 
Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of the causal factors in percentages. 
 
3.2.4. Additional Data Collection 
An additional set of incident data was collected to see if the same pattern of root causes 
continued to exist at the sites, by taking reports which were newer. Twenty-one incident reports, 
3 fatalities and 18 lost-time injuries, were obtained, and a similar root cause analysis was done 
for all the reports. It was found that only 2 of the 21 cases had men-related root causes while the 
19 remaining incidents had method-related causes. This shows that method-related causes are a 
serious threat to safety at the sites where this research was done. 
Machine 
4% 
Material 
2% 
Men 
36% 
Method 
58% 
Causal Factor 
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3.3. Method-Statement Model 
The possible causes for improper methods causing incidents were brainstormed by 
talking to experts in the field. The reason behind this is lack of or the poor design for the method 
statements, or their poor enforcement. A model was developed as shown in Figure 7. The model 
is explained in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
Figure 7. Method-Statement Model 
 
3.3.1. Poor Design of the Method Statements 
Method statements are documents that explain how an activity should be done, with what 
resources, and with what competencies. Poor design for the method statements is assumed as the 
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problem base of improper methods being followed. At construction sites, method statements are 
generally made for a few critical activities only. Sometimes, a trade as dynamic as construction 
requires more, and a few method statements will be inadequate to execute a task safely. A good 
system should cover all the activities with higher priority for critical activities. 
3.3.2. Poor Enforcement of the Method Statements 
If the safe work methods are designed reasonably well, the only other way correct 
methods can get lost along the way would be a lack of or poor enforcement for the method 
statements. Poor enforcement could be explained by the following factors: 
3.3.2.1. Management’s Commitment 
Management’s commitment has a direct correlation with site safety as well as injury and 
illness rates (Abudayyeh et al. 2006). Method statements are nothing but a safety-management 
system that is implemented by the top management. Hence, the enforcement directly depends on 
the commitment of the managers. 
3.3.2.2. Negligence of Rules and Procedures 
Generally, the workers’ repeated negligence of rules and procedures implies that the 
enforcement of using proper methods is low. 
3.3.2.3. Work-Method Training 
Appropriate safety education and training are one of the important factors that influence 
safety-program implementation (Aksorn and Hadikusumo 2008). To enforce safe work methods, 
training specific to the activity is required. Whether such a training system is present and, if so, 
whether it is adequate can only be understood from the workers’ perceptions. 
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3.3.2.4. Communication 
Communication is a significant predictor of safety behavior (Cigularov et al. 2010). 
There must be proper communication about the instructions and methods before and during the 
activity for the workers who do it. Thus communication is one of the main aspects of good 
enforcement. 
3.3.2.5. Supervision 
As seen from the incident-investigation reports, many incidents were attributed to a lack 
of or ineffective supervision. Since this is a serious problem. 
3.4. Summary of Results 
The analysis of incident-investigation reports showed that method-related root causes 
resulted in various injuries to workers, and this was confirmed by collecting more recent data 
from the sites. There is a need for a system which tells the workers what they should do. The 
method statement is one such system; this process is a step-by-step procedure for doing an 
activity. The supervisors’ duty is to ensure that these methods are followed. Unfortunately, 
method statements are neither well-designed nor properly enforced at all sites, in general, which 
is the main cause for most incidents. Therefore, it was inferred from the data analysis that 
method-related causes are most prevalent, and the focus area is the design and enforcement of 
method statements. 
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4. SOFTWARE APPLICATION FOR METHOD STATEMENTS 
4.1. A Software Concept 
One important problem with documentation is the process itself being very laborious and 
time consuming. Writing method statements is no exception, so a software model was created to 
reduce the time it takes to type each document. It is a well-known fact that the macros in 
Microsoft Excel and Visual Basic program software is used to quicken repetitive tasks done with 
MS Office products. Therefore, I created an application called Quick Write on the Visual Basic 
platform. The application was integrated with Excel to create method statements. The software 
design structure is shown in Figure 8. 
 
  
Figure 8. Quick Write Software Architecture 
 
The intention of the software is not to intuitively write method statements but to facilitate 
writing the method statements with time-saving options. The interface consists of Visual Basic 
(VB) forms which take input, and the program behind the forms creates an Excel file based on 
the input data. The input is given by means of a textbox, a number of checked boxes, data grid 
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view, and buttons. Most commands are given by clicking the mouse, and this process saves lot of 
time that could be wasted typing data in a Word file. The checked boxes are also lists from 
which the user can pick the items, so they avoid missing any of the requirements. Provisions are 
made in the software to add new requirements that are not listed in any of the checkboxes. There 
are also options to add files. A template file has already been created with all the necessary 
formatting. The software accesses this template to create a new method-statement file; the need 
for formatting is minimized, and more time is saved. 
The following pages show a step-by-step demonstration to use the software for writing a 
method statement for the “Material Lifting by Chain Pulley” activity. 
1. Main interface (Figure 9) pops up when opening the application. It has a textbox to 
type the name of the activity, a button to open a new form to select requirements, a button to add 
the scheme drawing, a button to add the material-safety data, a numeric box to select the number 
of persons who will be doing the activity, a button to select the personnel requirements, and two 
buttons to either approve or cancel the process. The operations can only be done in tandem, and 
alerts are prompted if tried to do otherwise. 
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Figure 9. Main Interface 
 
2. Name of the activity is entered in the provided box, and the “Requirements Select” 
button is clicked. This step will open a new form (Figure 10) with six checklist boxes, one for 
each of the following: 
 Equipment and tools  
 Certifications and authorizations  
 Legislations and codes  
 Precaution measures  
 Contingency measures  
 PPE 
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Figure 10. Form to Edit Requirements 
 
3. At least one item in each checklist should be checked in order to proceed. Otherwise, a 
prompt alerts the user to select something. If an item is not available in the provided checklist, 
the item can be added by clicking on the “New” button provided under the respective box. After 
selecting all the necessary requirements, the “OK” button is clicked to close the form and to go 
back to the main interface (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Accepting Requirements 
 
4. The next step is adding the file that shows the scheme drawings and other instructions. 
Generally, a scheme drawing is required to be prepared for the activity; the drawing shows the 
access provisions, walkways, emergency escape, etc. By clicking the “Add” file next to Scheme, 
a file browser dialog opens, and the user can select the particular file (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Adding Files 
  
5. The same procedure is repeated to add the material-safety data file which contains 
details related to material handling and storage. Then, the number of persons who will be doing 
the activity is selected by scrolling the numeric textbox. If the number is 1 or greater, the “Edit 
Requirements” button is activated (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Editing Personnel Requirements 
  
6. After clicking the “Edit Requirements” button, the form where the user can edit the 
name, qualifications, and training requirements for each person opens (Figure 14). This form has 
a data grid with four columns. The first column has the serial numbers, and names can be entered 
in the second column. Names can also be left blank to be completed later before the start of the 
activity. The “Qualification” column has a combo box containing different designations. 
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Figure 14. Entering Details 
 
7. Each person’s training requirements are added by clicking the button in the last cell of 
the corresponding row. This button opens another form (Figure 15) with a checklist box 
containing different training requirements. As before, a “New” button is provided to add any 
requirement that is not given. After clicking OK on Training Requirements and Personnel Details 
forms, the “Continue” button is clicked on the main interface (Figure 16). 
36 
 
 
Figure 15. Editing the Training Requirements 
    
 
 
Figure 16. Finishing the Editing 
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8. The application interface is closed automatically and a new file is created in the “C:” 
drive; the file automatically opens when clicking the “Continue” button. The Excel file is 
generated from a macro-enabled template located in the system (Figure 17). Hence, the 
formatting and all other time-consuming jobs are eliminated. All the details entered in the 
application appear in the Excel file under their respective headings. The files that were added 
under Scheme and MSDS also appear as hyperlinks. In order to open these files, the file names 
should be clicked. 
 
Figure 17. Excel Window Opened for Editing 
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9. Then, the document number, execution procedure, and the clean-up or restoration 
procedures can be filled up manually. After writing each point under the execution procedure 
and contingency procedures, with the row in which the point is written still selected, the green 
button shown near the headings can be clicked to insert a new row to write the next point. This 
macro feature was created to save time when inserting new rows, drawing borders, and merging 
cells. Because it is a macro feature, the “undo” (Ctrl+Z) option does not undo the row created by 
pressing the green button. Hence, a red button is provided to delete a row which was created 
accidentally (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Entering Execution Procedure 
 
10. After all the points in the procedures are written, the added Scheme drawing and 
MSDS files are opened. All the files are printed one by one and filed together, along with the 
risk-assessment documents. The final, printable document is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Final Method Statement 
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Thus, a safe work method for an activity is created in a fraction of the time. Most items 
are lists, hence the need for writing long, complex sentences and the difficulty of comprehending 
it are eliminated. 
4.2. Limitations 
This software is not without limitations. First, the tool requires that risk assessment is 
done separately from making the method statements. The hazard identification and risk 
assessment need to be done manually by the user because an interface is not provided This 
software does not perform the task of writing method statements intuitively. It only facilitates the 
process to save time. The checklists provided in the software tend to be too long and it will be 
confusing and annoying to pick from the lists. The applicability of this software for all activities 
is not certain. The additions made to the checklists if an item is not available do not remain, and 
they disappear once the application is closed. New items need to be added programmatically to 
keep them in the checkboxes. 
4.3. Scope for Improvement 
This software concept will be a very useful tool which will change the way method 
statements are perceived. With further software improvements, the quality of method statements 
can be improved greatly. 
First, integrating hazard-identification and risk-assessment processes with the software 
using a similar interface will add benefits. 
Second, this software could be developed in a higher programming-language platform to 
make it more user-friendly. In such a case, MS Excel will not necessarily be required for typing 
method statements and fewer clicks will be required to directly print the added reference files. 
41 
 
The currently provided checklists are of limited scope. The next versions need to have the 
ability to load the checklists from a database. This database can be created and maintained at the 
organization’s central office and can be accessible to employees with varying degrees of 
permission levels, depending on the designations. Also, a keyword search bar could be used to 
avoid the unnecessary process of scrolling through long checklists. Integrating this software with 
a server will make it accessible from anywhere through the Internet. A web-based form, such as 
a PHP application, can be used so that a copy can be generated from anywhere while the 
database is still updated. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Conclusion 
 Method-related causes existed more at the construction site, and they were the cause for a 
higher proportion of the incidents. 
 The enforcement of methods is low because method trainings are not provided on a 
regular basis. Communicating the methods and the competence of the subcontractor’s 
supervisors needs to be improved. 
  Negligence of rules and procedures by the workers must be curbed.  
 A part of the problem that needs to be addressed, improving the work methods followed 
at construction sites, involved giving guidelines and having a different approach for 
method statements. 
 Proper designs for method statements and the subsequent enforcement will not only help 
avoid incidents by improving work methods, but will also improve job planning. The 
implication of this is that frequent work stoppages by safety authorities at construction 
sites for violating safety rules can be avoided by better planning and guidance offered by 
safe work-method statements.  
 The developed VB software can be used to write method statements that account for all 
the requirements of the proposed model which, in turn, can be used to improve the work 
methods followed at site. This will help to avoid incidents which arise from non-inherent 
causes. 
5.2. Limitations of the Research  
 The collected data came from refinery and thermal power-plant construction projects, 
hence the findings may only apply to these kinds of projects.  
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 There may be other factors, such as geographical, socio-economic, or cultural factors, 
which could be attributed to method-related incidents. However, these factors were not 
explored in this research. 
  The solution concept only focused on improving the design of method statements and 
did not address the issue of poor enforcement. 
  As already known, the construction industry is dynamic. The popular belief is that using 
software for safety plans is dangerous because it might lead to missing some of the risks 
or precautionary measures that should be taken. This is the fundamental reason that this 
software is made so that it does not, say, identify the precautions or applicable codes 
automatically, but it is the user who has to pick or add what is required. 
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